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I. DEBTOR'S CONTRACTUAL WAIVER OF APPRAISAL
RIGHTS HELD INVALID
In SCN Mortgage Corp. v. White' the South Carolina Supreme Court
affirmed the court of appeals' holding that a contractual waiver of appraisal
rights is invalid as contrary to public policy.2 This holding overrules the
court's decision in Tri-South Mortgage Investors v. Fountain.'
SCN Mortgage Corp. v. White consolidated appeals from ten foreclosure
actions. The plaintiff sought foreclosure of the ten mortgages and the right to
deficiency judgments if sale of the properties did not satisfy the debts. Each
of the ten mortgages contained a waiver of the statutory right to an appraisal.'
The provision stated: "[T]he mortgagor waives the benefit of any appraisement
laws for the State of South Carolina."5 The defendant debtors asserted that
this waiver was invalid as a violation of public policy. The trial judge held the
waiver of appraisal rights effective. Citing Anderson Bros. Bank v. Adams,6
the South Carolina Court of Appeals reversed the lower court's decision.7 The
South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals. 8
The South Carolina Supreme Court began its opinion with a recitation of
the statutory right to appraisal.9 A defendant in a real estate foreclosure
proceeding in which a personal judgment is sought may apply for an order of
appraisal of the property within thirty days after the sale of the mortgaged
property.' 0 Following the appraisal, the deficiency judgment is reduced to
reflect the appraised amount."
1. _ S.C. _, 440 S.E.2d 868 (1994).
2. See SCN Mortgage Corp. v. White, 309 S.C. 146, 420 S.E.2d 514 (Ct. App. 1992), aff'd,
S.C. _, 440 S.E.2d 868 (1994).
3. 266 S.C. 141, 221 S.E.2d 861 (1976), overruled by SCN Mortgage Corp. v. White,
S.C. _, 440 S.E.2d 868 (1994).
4. SCNMortgage Corp., 309 S.C. at 147-48,420 S.E.2d at 514-15.
5. Id. at 148, 420 S.E.2d at 515.
6. 305 S.C. 25, 406 S.E.2d 173 (1991).
7. SCNMortgage Corp., 309 S.C. at 148, 420 S.E.2d at 515.
8. SCNMortgage Corp., _ S.C. _, 440 S.E.2d 868.
9. Id. at _, 440 S.E.2d at 869.
10. S.C. CODE ANN. § 29-3-680 (Law. Co-op. 1991).
11. S.C. CODE ANN. § 29-3-740 (Law. Co-op. 1991). The court's decision in Tri-South
Mortgage Investors v. Fountain, 266 S.C. 141, 221 S.E.2d 861 (1976), offers a clear
characterization of the statutes: "They provide a method by which a mortgagor can have the real
estate involved in a foreclosure appraised at the fair value, which appraisal figure shall be then
used as the basis for computing the deficiency judgment rather than the highest price bid at a
judicial sale." Tri-South, 266 S.C. at 147, 221 S.E.2d at 864.
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The supreme court noted the court of appeals' reliance on Anderson Bros.
Bank v. Adams in its acceptance of the argument that a waiver of statutory
appraisal rights is a violation of public policy.' Acknowledging that
"necessity often drives debtors to make ruinous concessions" when they are
attempting to secure a loan, the Anderson Bros. court held that a debtor's
contractual waiver of appraisal rights is invalid as to a guarantor.3 That is,
a guarantor is not bound by the debtor's waiver of the right to appraisal.
The South Carolina Supreme Court extended the Anderson Bros. holding
to protect debtors from their own waiver.' 4 Mentioning the Anderson Bros.
court's reliance on case law from other jurisdictions that recognize that the
waiver of a debtor's statutory rights is against public policy, the supreme court
pronounced its intention to "join those jurisdictions that give effect to a
debtor's statutory rights." 15 Adopting the language of the Anderson Bros.
court, the supreme court concluded that the application of the appraisal statute
should protect the debtor by preventing a waiver in advance.' 6 The court held
the contractual waiver of appraisal rights invalid as a violation of public
policy. '
7
Neither the opinion of the court of appeals nor that of the supreme court
expressly discuss the rationale for extending the holding of Anderson Bros.
The court of appeals' opinion explicitly recognized that the Anderson Bros.
ruling was confined to guarantors.18 Nevertheless, the court of appeals
thought "the logic of the rule set forth in Anderson Brothers Bank applies even
more forcefully to the notemakers who became debtors upon signing the
notes. " 15' While the supreme court mentioned the possible limitation on the
application of Anderson Bros., it did not discuss any basis, beyond its
invocation of public policy, for extending the invalidity of contractual waivers
of appraisement as to guarantors to include the debtors themselves.
The lack of an explicit justification for the extension of Anderson Bros.
to include notemaker debtors is significant. Although the Anderson Bros.
opinion includes far-reaching dicta and citations from other jurisdictions
espousing public policy rationale, the actual holding is narrow: "We hold that
boilerplate language, inserted by Bank, at the end of a mortgage signed only
by Debtors, is not binding upon Guarantors. " This statement implies that
12. SCNMortgage Corp., _ S.C. at __, 440 S.E.2d at 869.
13. Anderson Bros., 305 S.C. at 28, 406 S.E.2d at 175 (quoting Salter v. Ulrich, 138 P.2d
7, 9 (Cal. 1943)).
14. SCN Mortgage Corp., _ S.C. at _, 440 S.E.2d at 869.
15. Id. at __,440 S.E.2d at 869.
16. Id. at _, 440 S.E.2d at 869.
17. Id. at _,440 S.E.2d at 869.
18. SCNMortgage Corp., 309 S.C. at 148, 420 S.E.2d at 515.
19. Id.
20. Anderson Bros., 305 S.C. at 28, 406 S.E.2d at 175 (emphasis added).
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the guarantor's failure to sign the agreement is a determinative issue. 21 The
Anderson Bros. holding can thus be adequately explained by the principle that
a third party cannot be bound by a contract it did not sign.' The court also
emphasized that the waiver language was boilerplate and printed in small type
at the end of the mortgage.' This may further limit application of the case
to instances where the waiver is inconspicuous and not a negotiated term in the
contract. Furthermore, the Anderson Bros. court only briefly mentioned the
public policy considerations underlying the application of the appraisal statute
despite an alleged waiver.24 The decision does not appear to rest on public
policy grounds.
The South Carolina Supreme Court's decision in SCN Mortgage Corp. v.
White overrules Ti-South Mortgage Investors v. Fountaini' "to the extent it
is inconsistent" with the opinion.26 The court in Tri-South held a contractual
waiver of the South Carolina statutory appraisal rights valid despite the
argument that these rights could not be waived because they concerned public
policy.2 7 The Ti-South court based its decision on a distinction between
individual and public interests. The court explained that statutory rights
usually may be waived by agreement unless a question of public policy is
involved. 29 However, an agreement is not contrary to public policy simply
because it waives a statutory right.3" "'Whether the effect of any specific
statute can be avoided by agreement depends upon whether the statute is one
enacted for the protection of the public generally or whether it is designed
solely for the protection of the rights of individuals, in which case it may be
waived.'"31 The Tn-South court concluded that because the South Carolina
appraisal statute protects only a small sector of the public, individuals against
whom a deficiency judgment is sought in a foreclosure action, the statute may
21. See id.
22. Cf. North Charleston Joint Venture v. Kitchen of Island Fudge Shoppe, Inc., 307 S.C.
533, 416 S.E.2d 637 (1992) (holding that a guarantor is not bound by a clause waiving the right
to a trial by jury in a lease that did not name guarantor and to which guarantor was not a party).
23. Anderson Bros., 305 S.C. at 28, 406 S.E.2d at 175.
24. See id.
25. 266 S.C. 141, 221 S.E.2d 861 (1976).
26. SCN Mortgage Corp., _ S.C. at _, 440 S.E.2d at 869.
27. Tri-South Mortgage Investors, 266 S.C. at 147, 221 S.E.2d at 864. The South Carolina
code sections cited by the court in this opinionare the predecessors to § 29-3-680 and § 29-3-740
cited in SCN Mortgage Corp., - S.C. at _, 440 S.E.2d at 869.
28. Tri-South Mortgage Investors, 266 S.C. at 147, 221 S.E.2d at 864.
29. Id. (citing 17 Am. JUR. 2D Contracts § 173 (1964)); see 17A AM. JUR. 2D Contracts
§ 256 (1944) (stating that "[r]ights conferred as a matter of public policy cannot be waived").
30. Tri-South Mortgage Investors, 266 S.C. at 147, 221 S.E.2d at 864 (citing 17 AM. JUR.
2D Contracts § 173 (1964)).




et al.: Contract Law
Published by Scholar Commons, 1995
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
therefore be waived.32 The court further reasoned that if the statute truly
protected a public policy interest, it would not stipulate that statutory
protection is sacrificed in the absence of a timely petition.33
The requirement for a timely petition, cited in Tri-South as evidence of
private interest protection, is more appropriately explained as a legislative
desire to appraise property as near in time to the actual sale as possible. A
timely petition ensures that the appraisal amount is accurate and reflects the
fair value of the property at the time of sale. Furthermore, the Ti-South
court's conclusion that because only judgment debtors are protected the statute
must involve only a private interest, is illogical. The Tri-South reasoning leads
to the result that a statute protecting only those who fall within the realm of
the statute, as all statutes do, can never reach the level of protecting a public
interest. Therefore, despite the supreme court's failure to clearly distinguish
its decision in SCN Mortgage Corp. v. White from Tn-South, the Tn-South
decision appears to rest on dubious grounds.
The supreme court's decision in SCN Mortgage Corp. v. White does not
go so far as to make a distinction between statutes enacted to protect the public
good or those designed to protect private interests. The public policy argument
advanced by the court consists of a general reference to the Anderson Brothers
dicta34 and a citation to Dennis v. Moses. 5 Although the court failed to
articulate its rationale for holding that the appraisal statute protects a public
interest, a public policy justification does exist. In Salter v. Ulrich,36 cited in
the Anderson Brothers opinion,37 the court declared unenforceable and void
"'any agreement exacted from a borrower as a condition to the making or
renewing of any loan secured by a deed of trust, mortgage or other lien...
whereby the borrower agrees to waive any [statutory] rights."38 The court
recognized that unfortunate circumstances often force debtors to make "ruinous
concessions" when in need of a loan and implied that statutes should be
enforced to protect the public in such instances.39
The Supreme Court of Washington also followed this public policy
rationale in Dennis v. Moses,40 holding that the advance contractual waiver
32. Id. at 148, 221 S.E.2d at 864.
33. Id.; see S.C. CODE ANN. § 29-3-680 (Law. Co-op. 1991) (stipulating that an application
for an order of appraisal must be made within thirty days of the sale of the mortgaged property).
34. SCN Mortgage Corp., _ S.C. at_, 440 S.E.2d at 868.
35. 52 P. 333 (Wash. 1898).
36. 138 P.2d 7 (Cal. 1943).
37. Anderson Bros., 305 S.C. at 28, 406 S.E.2d at 175.
38. Salter v. Ulrich, 138 P.2d 7, 9 (Cal. 1943). The Salter court quoted this language from
the California Code of Civil Procedure. Even though the statute was enacted after the foreclosure
in question, the court followed its mandate.
39. Id.
40. 52 P. 333 (Wash. 1898).
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of statutory rights to appraisal following a foreclosure sale is void as against
public policy.4" The Dennis court stated: "[A]n act limiting the rights of a
citizen to contract with reference to his property must tend to promote the
public good in some way or it is an unwarranted interference therewith." 42
The court found the promotion of the public good in the spirit of the appraisal
act, which tended "to prevent the sacrifice of property.
" 41
South Carolina's appraisal act appears to possess a similar spirit. The
appraisal statute was enacted by the South Carolina Legislature during the
economic depression in the early 1930s. 4 The public policy underlying the
statute is revealed in the annual message of the Governor to the General
Assembly in 1933, the year the statute was enacted.45 Under the topic
heading "Early Steps to Relieve Mortgagors," the Governor suggested that
"any measure designed to benefit mortgagors and unfortunate debtors should
be presented early in the session that it may serve its intended purpose. "46
This purpose, as the heading preceding the statement indicates, was relief. The
appraisal statute appears to protect the public from compromising its right to
receive fair value for property in the event of a foreclosure and deficiency
judgment as a condition to obtain a mortgage. The public policy underlying the
statute is the protection of "unfortunate debtors"47 who may make "ruinous
concessions" 48 as a prerequisite to obtaining loans.
The South Carolina Supreme Court's decision in SCN Mortgage Corp. v.
White may be viewed as infringing on a party's right to contract. The decision
abrogates a party's right to waive the statutory appraisal provision in advance,
even if the waiver is a negotiated term in the contract. 49 Holding a contract
provision void conflicts with established contract law. A court cannot rewrite
a contract for parties when the plain language of the contract is capable of
construction.50 A court cannot relieve a party from the effect of unambiguous
contract terms despite the failure of the contracting party to protect its own
interests. 5' As stated in King v. Oxford,52 South Carolina courts "do not sit
41. Id.
42. Id. at 340.
43. Id. at 336.
44. Tri-South Mortgage Investors, 266 S.C. at 147, 221 S.E.2d at 864.
45. I.C. Blackwood, Message of Governor to the General Assembly (Jan. 10, 1933), in
REPORTS OF STATE OFFIcERS, BOARDS, AND COMMnrEnES TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE
STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 14 (1933).
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Salter v. Ulrich, 138 P.2d 7, 9 (Cal. 1943).
49. SCN Mortgage Corp., _ S.C. at , 440 S.E.2d at 869.
50. Conner v. Alvarez, 285 S.C. 97, 102, 328 S.E.2d 334, 336 (1985).
51. Gilstrap v. Culpepper, 283 S.C. 83, 86, 320 S.E.2d 445, 447 (1984).
52. 282 S.C. 307, 318 S.E.2d 125 (Ct. App. 1984).
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for the purpose of relieving parties who refuse to exercise reasonable diligence
or discretion to protect their own interests." 53 However, the South Carolina
Supreme Court's decision in SCN Mortgage Corp. v. White implies that the
public policy of protecting unfortunate debtors from ruinous concessions
trumps the normal rules of contract interpretation.
Susan E. Drake
II. FAILURE TO ACT BY DATE SPECIFIED IN A REAL ESTATE
SALES CONTRACT MAY NOT CONSTITUTE A MATERIAL BREACH
In Ackerman v. McMillan' the South Carolina Court of Appeals held that
a purchaser's failure to apply for financing within the time specified in a
contract of sale was not a material breach and thus did not warrant repudiation
of the contract by the sellers.2 The court held that a party to a contract may
repudiate the contract only when a breach by the other party is "so fundamen-
tal and substantial as to defeat the purpose of the contract. "I If the breach is
"not so material as to defeat the purpose of the contract, the nonbreaching
party is compensated by damages. "4
On December 4, 1989, Ackerman and the McMillans entered into a
written contract for the sale of the McMillans' home. The contract provided,
first, that the purchaser would apply for financing within ten days of the
execution of the contract. Second, the contract provided that the seller would
have the right to continue to offer the property for sale and, upon receiving
another offer, the purchaser would have forty-eight hours after notification of
the new offer to provide the seller "'reasonable evidence that any financing
required under [the] agreement will be granted.'"'
On February 5, 1990, the McMillans removed their home from the
market.6 Ackerman was informed of this decision on February 27, 1990. On
March 11, 1990, Ackerman, for the first time, applied for financing and
53. Id. at 312, 318 S.E.2d at 128 (citing Mobley v. Quattlebaum, 101 S.C. 221, 85 S.E. 585
(1915)).
1. _ S.C. _, 442 S.E.2d 618 (Ct. App. 1994).
2. Id. at _, 442 S.E.2d at 619-20.
3. Id. at_, 442 S.E.2d at 620 (citing Gibbs v. G.K.H., Inc., _ S.C. __, 427 S.E.2d 701
(Ct. App. 1993)).
4. See id. at__, 442 S.E.2d at 620 (citing Childress v. C.W. Myers Trading Post, Inc., 100
S.E.2d 391 (N.C. 1957)).
5. Id. at _, 442 S.E.2d at 619. The contract also provided that it was contingent upon the
purchaser completing the sale and closing of her home. Id. at _, 442 S.E.2d at 619. That
provision was not at issue in the case.
6. The McMillans decided they no longer needed to move to Florence. Ackerman, _ S.C.
at _ n.1, 442 S.E.2d at 619 n.1.
[Vol. 47
6
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 47, Iss. 1 [1995], Art. 5
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol47/iss1/5
CONTRACT LAW
informed the McMillans that she intended to close the sale of the house by
April 15, 1990, the closing date specified in the contract. Ackerman received
the money to close the sale from her father,7 but the closing never took place.
Consequently, Ackerman sued the McMillans for damages. A special referee
found that Ackerman could not recover damages because she had breached the
contract by failing to apply for financing within ten days and because she
failed to remove the contingency within forty-eight hours of learning that the
McMillans had decided to take the house off of the market.
Ackerman turns upon the court of appeals' interpretation of the provision
requiring Ackerman to apply for financing within ten days of the execution of
the contract. 9 The court agreed with the special referee's determination that
Ackerman's failure to comply with the provision constituted a breach of the
contract, but added that her breach did not constitute a material breach
justifying the McMillans' repudiation. Because Ackerman had obtained the
funds necessary to close the sale before the specified closing date, "the
purpose of the contract was not defeated." 10 The McMillans, thus, had no
right to repudiate the contract; they could only seek damages for Ackerman's
failure to comply with the financing provision within the ten day allotted time
period.'
Implicit in the court's holding is the determination that the time restriction
in the contract did not amount to a "time of the essence" clause. Although
South Carolina law regarding this topic is minimal, an analysis of existing
South Carolina case law, as well as that of other jurisdictions, indicates that
the decision in Ackerman is not inconsistent with the widely held theory that
7. Ackerman applied at another institution and was approved for a $100,000 loan contingent
upon the bank's receiving an acceptable appraisal of the house. Because the appraiser was denied
access to the house, Ackerman approached her father for the money. Id. at - nn.2-3, 442
S.E.2d at 619 nn.2-3.
8. Id. at _, 442 S.E.2d at 619.
9. The court of appeals determined that the special referee erred in treating the McMillans'
decision to stay as an offer to themselves which triggered the 48 hour contingency provision. A
general rule of contract law provides that the parties must have a mutual obligation to complete
the contract. 17 C.J.S. Contracts § 100(1) (1963). The court decided that the McMillans' offer
to themselves was invalid because "[a] contract by one with himself is void." Ackerman, _
S.C. at __, 442 S.E.2d at 620 (citing Moore v. Bennettsville Warehouse Co., 136 S.C. 312,
134 S.E. 395 (1925)). Such contracts lack mutuality of obligation. Id. at , 442 S.E.2d at 620
(citing Alala v. Peachtree Plantations, Inc., 292 S.C. 160, 355 S.E.2d 286 (Ct. App. 1987)); see
also Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. DeLoache, 297 F. Supp. 647, 658 (D.S.C. 1969) ("In the law
of contracts, mutuality, both in definition and in application, is largely synonymous with
consideration." (citations omitted)). Consequently, the court of appeals held that Ackerman had
no duty under the contract to remove the 48 hour contingency, and reversed the special referee's
finding to the contrary.
10. Ackerman, - S.C. at __, 442 S.E.2d at 620.
11. Id. at _, 442 S.E.2d at 620.
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time is of the essence in real estate law when expressly provided for in the
sales contract.
A general rule of real estate law states that "time will not be regarded as
of the essence of the contract merely because a definite time for performance
is stated therein, without any further provision as to the effect of nonperfor-
mance at the time stated."12 In order for time to be treated as of the essence
in a contract for the sale of realty, "it should clearly appear therefrom that
such was the intention of the parties; as, for example, by a provision that the
agreement shall be void unless the act named be completed by a certain day,
or by other equivalent expression." 3 Although the contract in Ackerman did
state that the contract would be terminated if the buyer failed to provide
evidence of financing approval within forty-.ight hours of a second offer, no
similar provision applied to the ten-day limit for application for financing. 
4
Often, contract disputes regarding failure to comply with express "time
of the essence" clauses involve a failure to close the sale of the real estate 5
or the failure to make a necessary payment by the dates specified in the
contract. 16 However, none of the cases surveyed in this area have dealt with
an application for financing provision like that at issue in Ackerman. Also,
taking into account that "time of the essence" clauses have become boilerplate
and are often inserted without consideration of the importance of time in the
transaction,17 a conclusion that time would be of the essence to all terms of
the contract is questionable.
Had the court of appeals determined that time was of the essence as to the
financing application provision, the court's holding might still be justified.
Even if an express provision makes time of the essence applicable to terms of
a contract, the stipulated time limit may be extended either by agreement or
waiver of both parties.'" Thus, even though a sales contract may contain an
12. 91 C.J.S. Vendor & Purchaser § 104, at 1000 (1955); seealso Scheerv. Doss, 83 S.E.2d
612, 614 (Ga. 1954) ("'Merely prescribing a day at or before which the act must be done, does
not render the time essential with respect to such act.'" (quoting Ellis v. Bryant, 48 S.E. 352,
353 (Ga. 1904))).
13. Mangum v. Jones, 54 S.E.2d 603, 607 (Ga. 1949) (citations omitted); see also Bishop v.
Tolbert, 249 S.C. 289, 153 S.E.2d 912, 918 (1967) (stating that generally time is not of the
essence of a contract unless made so expressly or by implication from the surrounding
circumstances).
14. See Ackerman, _ S.C. at _, 442 S.E.2d at 619.
15. See, e.g., Miceli v. Dierberg, 773 S.W.2d 154 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989); Realco Equities,
Inc. v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 540 A.2d 1220 (N.H. 1988); Zahl v. Greenfield, 556
N.Y.S.2d 393 (App. Div. 1990).
16. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Glens Falls Ins. Co., 27 F.2d 64 (4th Cir. 1928); Goff v.
Graham, 306 N.E.2d 758 (Ind. Ct. App. 1974).
17. 2 ARTHUR R. GAUDIO, THE AMERICAN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 20.04 (1994).
18. Smith v. Hues, 540 S.W.2d 485,488 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976); see also Hart v. Lyons, 436
N.E.2d 723, 726 (Ii. App. Ct. 1982) (recognizing that parties can agree to extend the closing
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express "time of the essence" clause, the general consensus among courts
faced with interpreting these provisions is that the guarantee is not absolute,
but rather depends upon the intention of the parties and the circumstances
surrounding the making of the contract. 9 Similarly, section 2-302(c) of the
Uniform Land Transactions Act states that "[t]he phrase 'time is of the
essence' or other similar general language does not of itself provide explicitly
that failure to perform at the time specified discharges the duties of the other
party."2 By failing to insist that Ackerman comply with the financing
application provision, the McMillan's effectively extended the ten-day limit by
waiver. Thus, it seems likely that the outcome of Ackerman would have been
the same even if the contract had included a "time is of the essence"
provision.
Ackerman provides little guidance in determining when a breach of a
contract provision is a material breach. The court merely stated that a material
breach is one that is so substantial and fundamental as to defeat the purpose
of the contract. 2' South Carolina courts have not put forth a concrete test for
determining when a breach will be deemed material, thereby justifying
repudiation. However, the supreme court has adopted the standards set forth
in section 241 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts for determining
whether a failure to render or to offer performance is material.' Under
section 241, significant circumstances to be taken into account by a court
should include:
(a) the extent to which the injured party will be deprived of the benefit
which he reasonably expected;
(b) the extent to which the injured party will be adequately compensat-
ed for the part of that benefit which he will be deprived;
(c) the extent to which the-party failing to perform or to offer to
perform will suffer forfeiture;
date).
19. See, e.g., Ravitch v. Stollman Poultry Farms, Inc., 328 A.2d 711,716-17 (Conn. 1973);
Anest v. Bailey, 556 N.E.2d 280, 283 (II. App. Ct. 1990).
20. U.L.T.A. § 2-302 (1975). This section of the Act requires that the contract must clearly
state what will happen if the parties do not perform by the date specified; the section also has a
peripheral effect of limiting the boilerplate language of the clauses. See GAUDiO, supra note 17,
§ 2.04, at 20-48.
21. Ackerman, - S.C. at _, 442 S.E.2d at 620 (citing Gibbs v. G.K.H., Inc., __ S.C.
-, 427 S.E.2d 701 (Ct. App. 1993) and Childress v. C.W. Myers Trading Post, Inc., 100
S.E.2d 391 (N.C. 1957)).
22. Kiriakides v. United Artists Communications, _ S.C. _, , 440 S.E.2d 364, 366
(1994) (utilizing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 241 (1981) to determine whether a
breach of a commercial lease is trivial or immaterial).
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(d) the likelihood that the party failing to perform or to offer to
perform will cure his failure, taking account of all the circumstanc-
es including any reasonable assurances;
(e) the extent to which the behavior of the party failing to perform or
to offer to perform comports with standards of good faith and fair
dealing.?
Other jurisdictions have applied these factors to find that a material breach
exists where a purchaser failed to insure properties as required by the sales
contract and to pay the second and third installments due under the contract'
and where a contract provided that the purchaser could not make substantial
improvements or alterations without written consent from the vendors, and
purchasers' assignees demolished a building on the property without
consent.' These factors have also been used to determine that a material
breach does not exist where purchasers left a check for earnest money payable
to vendors at the designated bank instead of depositing cash with the bank as
required by the contract.26
Relying on the basic standard of materiality, the Ackerman court did not
apply the Restatement factors to the financing application provision.
Ackerman failed to comply with the ten day financing contingency, but her
failure to apply for financing within ten days of the execution of the contract
did not defeat its purpose. She was ready and willing to close the sale by the
April 15, 1990 deadline agreed upon by the parties. The McMillans'
repudiation of the contract did, however, defeat the purpose of the contract,
and the court thus concluded that their repudiation constituted a material
breach.
M. Jean Lee
23. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 241 (1981).
24. E.g., Goff v. Graham, 306 N.E.2d 758 (Ind. Ct. App. 1974).
25. E.g., Barber v. Freeman, 742 P.2d 711 (Or. Ct. App. 1987).
26. E.g., Cowman v. Allen Monuments, Inc., 500 S.W.2d 223 (rex. Civ. App. 1973).
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